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I. JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-
2a-3(2)(j) (2001). 
O. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. This court should refuse to consider Fennell's arguments on appeal due to 
his failure to abide by Rule 24, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
2. Fennell failed to comply with Rule 4-501(2)(B) of the Rules of Judicial 
Administration in opposing Wall's Motion for Summary Judgment, and therefore, Wall's 
Statement of Undisputed Facts was properly deemed admitted and summary judgment 
was appropriate. "CA trial court's interpretation of a rule in the Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration presents a question of law reviewed for correctness.'" Loporto v. 
Hoegemamu 1999 UT App 175, p, 982 P.2d 586 (quoting Hartford Leasing Corp. v. 
State, 888 P.2d 694, 697 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)). 
3. The trial court properly granted summary judgment on Fennell's negligent 
failure to disclose claim. Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine 
issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
See Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). The appellate court reviews the facts and all reasonable 
inferences in a light most favorable to the losing party. See Blue Cross and Blue Shield 
v. State. 779 P.2d 634, 636 (Utah 1989). Moreover, the appellate court reviews the trial 
court's conclusions of law for correctness, affording them no deference. See id. 
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4. The trial court properly granted summary judgment on Fennell's intentional 
failure to disclose claim. See Standard of Review for Issue #3. 
5, Fennell waived his breach of implied warranty claim. 
ffl. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In this case, James Ashley Fennell, II, ("Fennell") brougjit suit against 
Edward Green ("Green), Neil Wall ("Wall"), and GMW Development, Inc., dba Ivory 
North ("GMW"). Fennell alleged causes of action for negligent failure to disclose, 
intentional failure to disclose, and breach of an implied warranty, as a result of an alleged 
landslide that occurred on his residential property. Green and Wall developed the 
property and subsequently sold it to GMW. GMW agreed to build a home on the 
property and sell it to Fennell. Fennell sued Green, Wall and GMW for the diminished 
value of his residential property as a result of the alleged landslide, arguing that they 
knew or should have known of the condition, but failed to disclose it. Green, Wall, and 
GMW each filed motions for summary judgment, which the trial court granted. Fennell 
now brings this appeal. 
IV, STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. Wall and Green were developers of a subdivision know as Falcon 
Ridge Subdivision in Layton, Utah, and initially held title to lot 31. See Complaint at 
R.2-11. 
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2. In October of 1992, Wall and Green hired a professional geologist, 
Glenn R. Maughan ("Maughan"), to conduct a Geological Soils Investigation of Phase 2 
of the subdivision, which included lot 31. See Depo. of Neil J. Wall at R.756; Depo. of 
Glenn Roy Maughan at R.757. 
3. Maughan represented that lot 31 would be suitable for residential 
building. See R.759 
4. Maughan never told Green or Wall that lot 31 was susceptible to 
landslides nor did his report caution that lot 31 was in a landslide area. See R.761 
5. Maughan's report was on file with Layton City and at all relevant 
times was available for public inspection. See R.763. 
6. Green and Wall complied with all recommendations made by 
Maughan as well as recommendations from Layton City to make lot 31 safe for 
residential building purposes. See R.765. 
7. Green and Wall sold lot 31 to GMW on July 7, 1995. See R.769-
772. 
8. Prior to July 5, 1995, Fennell contracted with GMW for the 
acquisition of lot 31 and for the construction of a home. See R.4. 
9. At no time did Green and Wall enter into a contract with Fennell or 
even meet him. See R.776. 
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10. GMW constructed a home on property located at 1543 North 1050 
East, Layton, Utah. GMW conveyed title to Fennell by deed dated December 22, 1995, 
and Fennell moved into the home at issue. See R.4-5. 
11. Fennell alleges that on April 14, 1998, a landslide occurred on the 
back portion of the lot. See R.5 
12. No one was physically injured as a result of the landslide, nor was 
any other property damaged or destroyed because of the landslide. See R.783. 
13. Fennell then brought suit against, inter alia, Wall for negligent 
failure to disclose, intentional failure to disclose, and breach of implied warranty. See 
R.2-11. 
14. Wall then filed a Motion for Summary seeking dismissal of all 
claims pertaining to him. See R. 732-795. 
15. On October 25, 2001, the court heard the Motion for Summary 
Judgment filed by, inter alia, Wall. At the hearing, Fennell waived his claim for breach 
of implied warranty. See R. 1705 at pp.76-77. 
16. The trial court subsequently granted Wall's Motion for Summary 
Judgment for the following reasons: First, the trial court determined that summary 
judgment was proper due to Fennell's failure to abide by Rule of Judicial Administration 
4-501. See R. 1705 at p.92; R. 1608-09. In addition, and as a separate basis for granting 
summary judgment, the trial court determined that there were no genuine issues of 
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material fact that Wall had no knowledge of the alleged landslide condition. See R. 1705 
at p.92; R. 1609-10. Moreover, Fennell failed to establish the existence of a legal duty on 
the part of Wall to communicate with him, and the economic loss doctrine prevented 
Fennell from recovering under any of the theories of liability that he pled. See R. 1705 at 
pp.92-93;R.1610. 
V. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
1. This Court should refuse to consider Fennell's arguments on appeal 
due to his failure to abide by Rule 24, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Specifically, 
Fennell failed to provide a coherent statement of the issues on appeal or properly cite to 
the record even once. Accordingly, Fennell's brief should be disregarded or stricken and 
this court should assume the correctness of the trial court's judgment. 
2. The trial court properly granted summary judgment due to Fennell's 
failure to comply with Rule 4-501(2)(B) of the Rules of Judicial Administration. Fennell 
failed to specifically dispute any of the facts set forth by Wall in his Motion for Summary 
Judgment, as required by the rule, and the trial court thus correctly deemed admitted 
those facts. Based on those undisputed facts, the trial court then properly granted 
summary judgment in favor of Wall. 
3. The trial court properly granted summary judgment on Fennell's 
negligent failure to disclose claim. First, the economic loss rule precludes Fennell from 
recovering economic damages in negligence claims. Second, Fennell produced absolutely 
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no evidence that Fennell had any knowledge of the alleged landslide condition. Finally, 
Fennell failed to establish a prima facie case of negligence because there was no legal 
duty to communicate running from Wall to Fennell. 
4. The trial court also properly granted summary judgment on Fennell's 
intentional failure to disclose claim. First, no such cause of action exists in Utah. 
However, even if Fennell's claim could be characterized as a fraudulent non-disclosure 
claim (despite the lack of specificity in the pleading as required for an action for fraud), 
Wall was still entitled to summary judgment because Fennell failed to provide any 
evidence that Wall knew of material information and had a duty to communicate that 
information to Fennell. 
5. Fennell waived his breach of implied warranty claim. However, 
even if Fennell did not waive the claim, summary judgment was proper because Utah law 
does not recognize a claim for breach of implied warranty for habitability or fitness for 
residential property. 
VI. ARGUMENT 
ISSUE I 
TfflS COURT SHOULD REFUSE TO CONSIDER FENNELL'S ARGUMENTS 
ON APPEAL FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH RULE 24 OF THE UTAH 
RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE. 
This court should not consider Fennell's arguments on appeal due to his 
failure to abide by Rule 24, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Specifically, the rale 
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requires the appellant to provide a statement of the issues presented for review. See Utah 
R. App. P. 24(a)(5). In addition, Rule 24(e) provides: "References shall be made to the 
pages of the original record as paginated pursuant to Rule 11(b) . . . ." Utah R. App. P. 
24(e) (2002) (emphasis added). In his brief, Fennell failed to set forth a coherent 
statement of the issues,1 or even properly cite to the record once. 
Utah's appellate courts have previously "voiced their frustration with briefs 
which fail to comply with Rule 24," and "have routinely refused to consider arguments 
which do not include a statement of the facts properly supported by citations to the 
recordr State v. Price, 827 P.2d 247, 249 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (emphasis added); see 
also, e.g.. Trees v. Lewis, 738 P.2d 612, 612-13 (Utah 1987) (court dismisses appeal 
because appellant "has not supported the facts set forth in his brief with citations to the 
record" as required by the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure); Koulis v. Standard Oil 
Co. of California, 746 P.2d 1182, 1184 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) ("If a party fails to make a 
concise statement of the facts and citation of the pages in the record where those facts are 
supported, the court will assume the correctness of the judgment below."); Uckerman v. 
Lincoln Nat. Life Ins. Co., 588 P.2d 142, 144 (Utah 1978) (providing appellate court 
"need not, and will not, consider any facts not properly cited to, or supported by, the 
1
 Fennell provides the following as the statement of the issues: "There is a factual dispute 
of a sufficient nature to warrant the denial of Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment." 
Fennell's Brief at p.3. Fennell did not list as an issue his failure to abide by Rule 4-501, which 
was a separate basis for granting summary judgment by the trial court. To add to the problem, 
the issues were not more clearly identified in the body of the brief. 
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record) (emphasis added); Steele v. Bd. Of Rev, of Indus. Com'ii 845 P.2d 960, 962 
(Utah Ct. App. 1993) ("If a party fails to a provide a statement of the facts along with a 
citation to the record where those facts are supported, we will assume the correctness of 
the judgment."). In fact, Rule 24 provides that briefs that are not in compliance "may be 
disregarded or stricken." Utah R. App. P. 24(j). Accordingly, because Fennell failed to 
comply with the requirements of Rule 24, this court should not consider his arguments on 
appeal and the correctness of the trial court's judgment should be assumed. 
ISSUE II 
FENNELL FAILED TO COMPLY WITH RULE 4-501(2)(B) OF THE RULES 
OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION IN OPPOSING WALL'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT, AND, THEREFORE, WALL'S STATEMENT OF 
UNDISPUTED FACTS WAS PROPERLY DEEMED ADMITTED 
AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS APPROPRIATE. 
Fennell contends on appeal that the trial court "abrogated its duties" in 
granting summary judgment based upon his failure to comply with Rule 4-501(2)(B) of 
the Rules of Judicial Administration.2 The trial court determined that summary judgment 
was proper in this case because the pleadings filed and matters presented did not create 
genuine issues as to any material facts. See R. 1607-11. Specifically, due to Fennell's 
2
 Fennell also contends that the trial court only granted summary judgment because "it 
desired a direction from the Appellate Court as to what law to apply to the facts." Fennell's Brief 
at p. 10. However, it is clear that the trial court did not grant summary judgment simply to receive 
guidance, but gave the decision considerable thought and contemplation. The trial court stated at 
the end of oral arguments: "So I have done my homework before making this ruling. I don't do it 
arbitrarily." R.1705 at p.94. 
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failure to abide by the provisions of Rule 4-501(2)(B) in opposing Wall's Motion for 
Summary Judgment, the Statement of Undisputed Facts set forth by Wall were deemed 
admitted and summary judgment was granted. See R. 1609. 
Rule 4-501(2)(B) provides: 
The points and authorities in opposition to a motion for 
summary judgment shall begin with a section that contains a 
verbatim restatement of each of the movant's statement of 
facts as to which the party contends a genuine issue exists 
followed by a concise statement of material facts which 
support the party's contention. Each disputed fact shall be 
stated in separate numbered sentences and shall specifically 
refer to those portions of the record upon which the opposing 
party relies. All material facts set forth in the movant's 
statement and properly supported by an accurate reference to 
the record shall be deemed admitted for the purpose of 
summary judgment unless specifically controverted by the 
opposing party's statement. 
(Emphasis added). 
In this case, it is clear that Fennell failed to comply with this rule. In 
responding to Wall's Motion for Summary Judgment, Fennell did not specifically dispute 
any of the facts set forth by Wall in support of his motion. As a result, after having read 
Fennell's memorandum opposing summary judgment several times, the trial court was 
still left to question whether Fennell contended there were any material facts in dispute. 
See R. 1705 at pp.41-43. Fennell's counsel was then questioned by the court concerning 
his failure to abide by the rule, to which he acknowledged he may have been deficient. 
SeeR.1705atp.43. 
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Fennell, however, now attempts to argue on appeal that he in fact complied 
with Rule 4-501(2)(B) as it existed at the time of briefing and arguments. See Fennell's 
Brief at p.20. In addition, he contends that even if he did not comply with the rule, it was 
improper for the trial court to grant summary judgment because "the adverse party is 
entitled to have the Court survey the evidence and all reasonable inferences . . . . " See id. 
at p.21. These arguments are simply without merit. 
First, it is clear that Fennell failed to comply with Rule 4-501(2)(B) as it 
existed at the time of briefing or the hearing. While Fennell argues that the trial court 
prematurely applied the November 2001 amendments to the rule in granting summary 
judgment for Wall, a close examination of the rule that was in effect for October of 2001 
reveals that Fennell was still required to dispute the moving party's material facts, which 
he failed to do. See Rule 4~501(2)(B), R. Jud. Adm. (2001). Accordingly, the trial court 
properly deemed Wall's facts admitted for the purpose of summary judgment. See Rule 
4-501(2)(B) (providing that material facts set forth and properly supported by the movant 
"shall be deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless specifically 
controverted by the opposing party's statement") (emphasis added). 
Second, the trial court then appropriately granted summary judgment due to 
Fennell's failure to comply with Rule 4-501(2)(B). Fennell argues that granting summary 
judgment based upon his deficiencies with Rule 4-501 deprived him of his substantive 
rights. See Fennell Brief at p. 19. However, Utah courts have consistently noted the 
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importance of complying with the Rules of Judicial Administration. See, e.g.. Morse v. 
Packer. 2000 UT 86, [^10, 15 P.3d 1021 (noting that trial court granted summary 
judgment for failure to respond to Motion for Summary Judgment within 10 days as 
required by Rule 4-501(l)(b)); Parker v. Dodgjon. 971 P.2d 496, 497 n.3 (Utah 1998) 
(Supreme Court noted that party's response to Motion for Summary Judgment did not 
conform to Rule 4-501 because it "set forth no disputed facts and contained no numbered 
sentences or citations"). 
In this case, having deemed admitted the facts set forth by Wall, the trial 
court then properly granted summary judgment in favor of Wall. According to Wall's 
undisputed facts, he hired a geologist to inspect the soil, he had no knowledge—actual or 
constructive-of an alleged landslide condition, he had no contract with Fennell, and he 
complied with all applicable regulations. See R. 1165-1167. Simply stated, admitting 
those undisputed facts for purposes of summary judgment pursuant to Rule 4-501, the 
trial court properly concluded that Fennell could not recover under any theory of liability 
against Wall and that judgment should be entered as a matter of law. 
ISSUE ra 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
ON FENNELL'S NEGLIGENT FAILURE TO DISCLOSE CLAIM. 
As a separate basis for granting summary judgment, the trial court also 
concluded that Fennell's negligent failure to disclose claim failed as a matter of law for 
three reasons. First, the economic loss rule precludes Fennell from recovering economic 
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damages in negligence claims. Second, there was absolutely no evidence that Wall had 
any knowledge of the alleged landslide condition. Third, Fennell could not establish a 
prima facie case of negligence because there was no duty running from Wall to Fennell. 
A. The Economic Loss Rule Precludes Recovery of Economic Damages in 
Negligence Claims. 
The trial court in this case properly determined that "the only issues of 
damage involved are those of economic loss for which no recovery is available under the 
theories pled by the plaintiff in this action . . . " R.1610. The economic loss rule 
adopted by Utah courts prohibits the recovery of economic losses under non-intentional 
tort claims. See American Towers Owners Ass'n. Inc. v. CCI Mechanical. Inc.. 930 P.2d 
1182, 1189 (Utah 1996); see also. East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerican Delaval Inc.. 
476 U.S. 858, 866-75, 106 S. Ct. 2295, 2300-04, 90 L.Ed.2d 865 (1986). In American 
Towers, a condominium owners' association brought suit against, inter alia, the 
contractors for design and construction defects in the plumbing and mechanical systems 
of a condominium complex. See 930 P.2d at 1184. The association had no contract with 
any of the defendants. See id. at 1187. The allegations were for, among other things, 
negligence, and the damages sought included the diminution in value of the 
condominiums. See id. at 1188. The trial court in American Towers dismissed the 
association's negligence claims based on the economic loss rule. See id. at 1188-89. The 
Utah Supreme Court affirmed, declaring: 
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The policy reasons supporting the economic loss rule 
are sound . . . [C]ontract principles resolve issues when the 
product does not meet the user's expectations, while tort 
principles resolve issues when the product is unsafe to person 
or property. 
. . . The law of torts imposes no standards upon the 
parties' performance of the contract; the only standards are 
those agreed upon by the parties.. . . Otherwise, the 
extension of tort law would result in "liability to an 
indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an 
indeterminate class." 
Id at 1190 (quotation omitted). The court further stated that "economic damages are not 
recoverable in negligence absent [a claim for] physical property damage or bodily 
injury." Id at 1189. 
As a result of the Utah Supreme Court's limiting recovery of economic 
losses to contract claims, economic losses cannot be recovered in a negligence action. 
Fennell seeks economic damages based on negligent failure to disclose, but he is 
precluded from doing so by the economic loss rule. Summary judgment in favor of Wall 
was therefore was appropriate. 
In addition, like the plaintiff in American Towers. Fennell does not seek 
damages to property that fits under any exception to the economic loss rule. The "other 
property" exception discussed in American Towers applies only when property other than 
property included in the integrated unit is damaged. See id. at 1191. The "other 
property" exception to the economic loss rule does not include component parts of 
finished products, like land and components used in the construction of a dwelling. See 
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id. (citing Casa Clara Condominium Ass'n v. Charley Toppino & Sons, Inc.. 620 So.2d 
1244, 1247 (Fla. 1993)). The American Towers court found the reasoning in 
Sensenbrenner v. Rust Orling & Neale, Architects, Inc.. 374 S.E.2d 55 (Va. 1998), 
applicable and instructive, and pronounced: 
The plaintiffs here allege nothing more than disappointed 
economic expectations. . . . The package included land, 
design services, and construction of a dwelling . . . The 
package is alleged to have been defective-one or more of its 
component parts was sufficiently substandard as to cause 
damage to other parts. The effect of the failure . . . was to 
cause a diminution in the value of the whole . . . . This is a 
purely economic loss, for which the law of contracts provides 
the sole remedy. 
American Towers, 930 P.2d at 1191 (quoting Sensenbrenner, 374 S.E.2d at 58). 
Just like in Sensenbrenner, Fennell does not allege damages beyond damage 
to the component parts of the integrated unit covered by the contract between Fennell and 
GMW. Accordingly, Fennell's negligence claim is not covered by the "other property" 
exception and summary judgment was proper. 
B. There Was No Evidence That Wall Had Any Knowledge Of An Alleged 
Landslide Condition. 
The trial court determined that summary judgment was also proper because 
Fennell produced no evidence that Wall had any knowledge of an alleged landslide 
condition at the time the subdivision was platted and the subject lot was sold to GMW. 
See R. 1609-10. In this case, Fennell argues that Wall knew or should have known of a 
landslide condition, and that he subsequently breached a duty by failing to disclose the 
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condition to Fennell. However, upon examining the record, it is clear that Wall took all 
appropriate measures to determine the stability of the land on the subject lot and did not 
know of an alleged landslide condition. 
Wall employed Maughan, a professional geologist and soils expert, to 
compose a written report about the property. See R.756-57. In his report, Maughan 
never indicated that the land was unstable or unsuitable for building because of any risk 
of landslides. See R.759, 761. In fact, the lack of any report to Wall that a landslide was 
possible on the property is not surprising, given that Maughan himself did not believe the 
lot posed a landslide threat. Referring to the subject lot at his deposition, Maughan 
testified as follows: 
Q. And you felt there was not a slide in that area, that the 
stream had simply undercut it? 
A. That's right. But to protect it we put the slope back so 
they-to allow for future sloughing. 
Q. Okay. So when you finished up with your analysis of 
this subdivision, you did not believe this area was a 
slide area in any of the lots, and that the only are 
where there had been some movement was on lot 21,3 
and that's because the stream had undercut the bank 
down below? 
A. That's right. 
Q. Is that a fair statement? 
3
 Lot 21 is now known as Lot 31, the subject lot of this litigation. 
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A. Yes. 
R.827. Maughan then again confirmed his opinion that the subject lot was not a slide 
area and that he did not caution in his report of any potential landslide conditions on Lot 
31. 
Q. . . . So my question is: If you'd had some data or an 
opinion that this was a landslide area, you certainly 
would have put that in your report and told somebody 
about it; is that true? 
A. That's true. 
R.1190. 
Simply stated, given the fact that the expert Green and Wall hired to 
perform the soil tests did not know of a landslide condition, it would be unreasonable to 
impute knowledge of the condition to Wall. There is absolutely no support for Fennell's 
contention that Wall had any information that lot 31 was located in a slide area. 
Therefore, Wall could not have withheld that information from either GMW or Fennell, 
and Wall was entitled to summary judgment on the failure to disclose claims. 
C. Fennell Failed To Establish A Prima Facie Case of Negligence Because 
Wall Had No Duty To Communicate With Him. 
The trial court also determined that Fennell failed to establish a legal duty 
on the part of Wall to communicate with him. See R. 1610. For causes of action based in 
negligence, the plaintiff must establish & prima facie case of negligence. See Bansansine 
v. Bodeli 927 P.2d 675, 676 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
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A prima facie case of negligence requires proof of four 
elements. (1) Defendant owed plaintiff a duty of care; (2) 
defendant breached that duty; (3) defendant's breach of duty 
was the actual and proximate cause of plaintiffs injury; and 
(4) plaintiff suffered damages as a result of defendant's 
breach of duty. 
Id.: see also Clark v. Farmers Ins. Exch.. 893 P.2d 598, 600-601 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
Furthermore, when a negligence claim is predicated on a failure to act, the plaintiff bears 
the burden of establishing a special relationship between the parties, creating a duty of 
the defendant to the plaintiff. See DCR, Inc. v. Peak Alarm Co.. 663 P.2d 433, 434 (Utah 
1983). 
Plaintiffs negligence claim in this case fails as a matter of law because 
there is no duty running from Wall to Fennell. "Duty is an essential element of 
negligence." Higgins v. Salt Lake County. 855 P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993). "Absent a 
showing of a duty [the plamtiff] cannot recover." Rollins v. Peterson. 813 P.2d 1156, 
1159 (Utah 1991) (quoting Beach v. University Utah. 726 P.2d 413 (Utah 1986)). "Duty 
is ca question of whether the defendant is under any obligation for the benefit of a 
particular plaintiff '" Ferre v. State. 784 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1989) (quotation 
omitted). "The issue of whether a duty exists is entirely a question of law to be 
determined by the court." IdL (citations omitted). "The law imposes upon one party an 
affirmative duty to act only when certain special relationships exist between the parties." 
Beach. 726 P.2d at 415. 
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Fennell contends, however, that such a duty was created by the Utah 
Supreme Court in Loveland v. Orem City Corp. 746 P.2d 763 (Utah 1987). In Loveland 
purchasers of a home brought an action against the land developer and others for 
wrongful death of their child that drowned in a canal near their home. See id. The court, 
determining that a developer "should not be subject to liability for all misfortune that 
might befall a purchaser," found that a developer has a limited duty to disclose material 
information to '"his purchaser'.'" Id at 769 (quoting Anderson v. Bauer, 681 P.2d 1316, 
1323 (Wyo. 1984)). More specifically, a developer's duty to disclose to his purchaser 
only extends to information the developer knows or should know about the property that 
makes it unsuitable for residential building. See id. (quoting Anderson. 681 P.2d at 
1323). Thus, under Loveland. any duty of disclosure owed by Wall would have been to 
GMW-not to Fennell. Therefore, because Wall was under no obligation to disclose to 
Fennell anything he allegedly knew regarding a landslide condition, Fennell failed to 
establish a prima facie case of negligence and summary judgment was proper. 
Two additional points on this issue: Utah appellate courts have previously 
determined that "the duty to disclose in a vendor-vendee transaction exists only where a 
defect is not discoverable by reasonable care," Maack v. Resource Design & 
Construction, Inc.. 875 P.2d 570, 579 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), or where the deficiencies 
"are easily discernible during an ordinary and reasonable investigation by the purchaser 
and that are in fact known by the purchaser." Loveland 746 P.2d at 769. Here, the soils 
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report that contains the information that Fennell alleges Wall failed to disclose was in fact 
a matter of public record on file with Layton City, and Fennell could have obtained it at 
any time. Since the information was discoverable by Fennell, the law does not impose 
upon Wall a duty to disclose. See id. 
Moreover, even if the court finds that a duty of care does exist, Fennell still 
cannot prove a prima facie case of negligence since there was no breach of the duty of 
care. Wall did everything that a reasonable person would do in his situation, as it is 
undisputed that he arranged for the soils reports to be done on the property by a 
professional geologist, filed the reports with Layton City, and complied with all of the 
recommendations of the reports and Layton City officials to make the lot buildable. 
Simply stated, even if there was a duty of care, Wall did not breach it and Fennell's 
negligence claim fails as a matter of law. 
ISSUE IV 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON 
FENNELL'S INTENTIONAL FAILURE TO DISCLOSE CLAIM. 
The trial court also properly granted summary judgment on Fennell's 
intentional failure to disclose claim. The trial court held: 
As a matter of law, plaintiff has also failed to state a claim in 
his pleadings for fraudulent non-disclosure and further, even 
if such a cause of action had been pled, there has been a 
failure to establish that the alleged non-disclosed information 
was known to Green and Wall. Further, plaintiff has failed to 
establish a legal duty on the part of Green and Wall to 
communicate with the plaintiff. 
19 
R.1610. 
In this case, Fennell pled a cause of action for intentional failure to 
disclose. See R.7. However, that cause of action does not exist in Utah. As the trial 
court noted, the more appropriate cause of action would have been for fraudulent non-
disclosure, which Fennell did not plead, and thus, summary judgment was appropriate. 
Even if, however, Fennell intended to plead a cause of action for fraudulent non-
disclosure, summary judgment would still appropriate because he was required to allege 
fraud with particularity, which he has not done. See Utah R. Civ. P. 9(b) ("In all 
averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be 
stated with particularity.") (emphasis added). 
Turning to the merits, however, the Utah Supreme Court discussed the 
issue of fraudulent non-disclosure in First Security Bank of Utah N.A. v. Banberry 
Development 786 P.2d 1326 (Utah 1990). There, the court held that a cause of action 
for fraudulent non-disclosure requires that the non-disclosed information be material, 
known to the party failing to disclose, and that there must also be a duty to communicate. 
See id. at 1328; see also Maack v. Resource Design & Constr.. Inc.. 875 P.2d 570, 578 
(Utah Ct. App. 1994). In this case, Fennell cannot demonstrate that the alleged non-
disclosed information was known to Wall or that Wall had a duty to communicate with 
Fennell. 
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As was more fidly set forth above, Fennell presented no evidence to 
establish that Wall had knowledge of the alleged landslide condition (let alone clear and 
convincing evidence) or that, even if Wall did have knowledge, that he also had a duty to 
communicate the landslide information to Fennell. See Andalex Resources. Inc. v. 
Mvers. 871 P.2d 1041, 1046 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (providing clear and convincing 
standard must be considered in determining whether motion for summary judgment 
should be granted on fraud claim). Again, given the evidence presented regarding the 
measures taken by Wall to ensure the property's stability and the remote relationship of 
Wall to Fennell, the trial court properly concluded that there was not sufficient evidence 
to sustain a cause of action for fraudulent non-disclosure even if it had properly been pled 
by Fennell. 
ISSUE V 
FENNELL WAIVED HIS BREACH OF IMPLIED WARRANTY CLAIM. 
In his Complaint, Fennell stated a cause of action for breach of implied 
warranty. See R.9-10. However, at the hearing on the motions for summary judgment, 
Fennell specifically abandoned this cause of action. 
MR. WELLS: For the third time, we're not dealing with 
habitability of the residence. We're 
dealing with the condition of the land. 
THE COURT: So is that an implied warranty or not? 
MR. WELLS: It's not an implied warranty in terms of 
dealing with habitability. 
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THE COURT: Okay, so is that under a negligent failure 
to disclose or an intentional failure to 
disclose or an implied warranty theory? 
MR. WELLS: It's not an implied warranty, it's failure 
to disclose. 
R.1705atpp.76-77. 
However, even if this court determines that Fennell did not abandon his 
breach of implied warranty claim, summary judgment was also proper on that claim. 
Utah law does not recognize a cause of action for breach of implied warranty of 
habitability on purchases of real property. In American Towers, the court stated, U[A] 
landlord of leased residential property may be liable for breach of implied warranty of 
habitability. . . . However, we have not extended such a warranty to purchasers of 
residential property." American Towers. 930 P.2d at 1193. The court then articulated its 
reasoning for disallowing a claim for breach of implied warranty by purchasers of 
residential property as follows: 
The main policy reasons behind extending an implied 
warranty of habitability to residential leases are the unequal 
bargaining position of the parties and the prospective tenant's 
limited ability to inspect and repair the property. These policy 
reasons are not present to the same degree in the purchase of 
residential property. The purchaser has the right to inspect 
the house before the purchase as thoroughly as that individual 
desires, and to condition purchase of the house upon a 
satisfactory inspection report. Further, if there are particular 
concerns about a home, the parties can contract for an express 
written warranty from the seller. Finally, if there are material 
latent defects of which the seller was aware, the buyer may 
have a cause of action in fraud. Therefore, the circumstances 
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presented to the purchaser of a residence are not closely 
analogous to those of a relatively powerless lessee. 
Id (quoting Maack 875 P.2d at 582-583). 
In addition, Utah law does not recognize a cause of action for breach of 
implied warranty of fitness for residential property. See Snow Flower Homeowners 
Ass'n. v. Snow Flower, Ltd.. 2001 UT App 207, 31 P.3d 576. In Snow Flower, a 
homeowners5 association brought suit against the developer and original seller of 
condominium units. See id. at ffl[2-5. The association alleged causes of action for, 
among other things, breach of implied warranty and breach of implied warranty of 
fitness. See id. atf5. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants on all 
breach of implied warranty claims based on the American Tower* ruling. See id. at %6. 
This Court affirmed, and in reaching its decision, stated: "Although the Association 
argues that its implied warranty claims are for breaches of an implied warranty and an 
implied warranty of fitness, we find that the Association's claims are indistinguishable 
from a claim for a breach of an implied warranty of habitability." See id. at 1f28. This 
court continued, "Utah does not recognize a claim for a breach of the implied warranty of 
habitability in the context of purchasers of residential property." Id at |30 (citing 
American Towers, 903 P.2d at 1193-94; Maack. 875 P.2d at 582-583). 
The facts of this case are almost identical to the facts in Snow Flower. Just 
as the plaintiff did in Snow Flower, Fennell alleged a cause of action for breach of 
implied warranty of fitness because breach of implied warranty for habitability was not a 
23 
valid cause of action in Utah. However, that claim obviously cannot stand in light of this 
Court's statement that the two causes of action in the context of residential property are 
indistinguishable. Utah does not recognize a cause of action for breach of implied 
warranty in the context of purchasers of residential property. Fennell's breach of implied 
warranty claim therefore fails, and Wall was entitled to summary judgment dismissing 
that claim.4 
VII. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Wall respectfully requests that this Court 
affirm the summary judgment entered by the trial court, dismissing all of Fennell's claims 
against Wall with prejudice. 
DATED this Z/^1 day of September, 2002. 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
ELIZABETH A. HRUBY-MEXS 
BRANDON H. HOBBS 
CHRISTIAN S. COLLINS 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee Wall 
4
 In addition, Fennell had the opportunity to inspect the property as thoroughly as he 
wanted before the purchase, including inspecting the soils report that was on file with Layton 
City. He also could have bargained for express warranties covering the property before 
completing the purchase. Plaintiff failed to take those precautions and thus should not be allowed 
to now make a claim for breach of implied warranty. 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY, 
LAYTON DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES ASHLEY FENNELL, II, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ] 
EDWARD D. GREEN, NEIL WALL, aka ; 
NEIL J. WALL and GMW DEVELOPMENT, ; 
INC., dba IVORY NORTH, ; 
Defendant. ] 
1 SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 
) DISMISSAL OF EDWARD D. 
) GREEN AND NEIL WALL, aka 
) NEIL J. WALL 
) Civil No. 000601295 PD 
i Judge Thomas L. Kay 
The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on the 25in day of October, 2001 at the 
hour of 9:00 a.m. before the Honorable Thomas L. Kay, District Court Judge on motions for 
summary judgment, including motions for summary judgment filed by Edward D. Green and 
Neil Wall, aka Neil J. Wall (hereinafter "Green and Wall"). 
The plaintiff was represented by his counsel of record and the defendants were 
represented by their counsel of record. 
The Court reviewed the memoranda in support of and in opposition to the motions 
and has reviewed the case law cited by the parties and having considered the same and the oral 
argument of counsel presented in favor of and in opposition to the motions, determined that the 
motions for summary judgment of Green and Wall should be and are hereby granted, dismissing 
the complaint of the plaintiff against them. The Court desires to set forth its reasoning for the 
granting of the motions for summary judgment of Green and Wall and provided explanation for 
the same at the time of ruling on the motions at the hearing and confirms the same as the basis 
for its ruling together with this statement of the reasons in this written Order. 
1. The time of the motions for summary judgment was appropriate as the parties had 
completed their discovery in this case giving the attorneys the opportunity to know the issues and 
facts. 
2. The Court believes that under the terms of Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, together with Rule 4-501 of the Rules of Judicial Administration, that summary 
judgment is warranted as the court determines from the pleadings filed and the matters presented 
that there are no genuine issues as to any material facts and that Green and Wall are entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. 
3. Rule 4-501(2)(B) is a rule that this Court has relied upon and does so in this case 
as a separate basis for the granting of the motions for summary judgment dismissing Green and 
Wall. In the materials filed by Green and Wall in support of their motions, said parties listed the 
facts by paragraphs which they contended were not in dispute. The rule required the plaintiff to 
set forth specifically: 
[A] concise statement of material facts as to which the party 
contends a genuine issue exists. Each disputed fact shall be 
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stated in separate numbered sentences and shall specifically 
refer to those portions of the record upon which the 
opposing party relies, and, if applicable, shall state the 
numbered sentence or sentences of the movant's facts that 
are disputed. All material facts set forth in the movant's 
statement and properly supported by an accurate reference 
to the record shall be deemed admitted for the purpose of 
summary judgment unless specifically controverted by the 
opposing party's statement. 
The Court determines that the plaintiff failed to comply with Rule 4-501(2)(B) and 
therefore the facts set forth in the memoranda filed by Green and Wall in support of their motions 
are deemed admitted and make summary judgment proper under the facts and circumstances of 
the legal arguments made. 
4. As a separate basis for the granting of the motions of Green and Wall, the Court 
has reviewed Exhibit 4 to the deposition of Neil J. Wall together with the deposition referred to 
and referenced by the parties of Glenn Roy Maughan. The Court determines that there are no 
genuine issues as to any material facts regarding the fact that at the time Maughan performed his 
soils studies on the lots in the proposed subdivision, including Lot 21, which became Lot 31 on 
the subsequent plan (see deposition Exhibits 1 and 5 of the Deposition of Neil J. Wall), Maughan 
was of the opinion that the area of the hill on the north side of Lot 31 was not a landslide. 
Accordingly. Green and Wall did not have knowledge of an alleged landslide condition as 
plaintiff now alleges, at the time that the subdivision was platted and the subject lot was sold to 
defendants GMW and Ivory North. Therefore, Green and Wall did not fail to disclose the alleged 
landslide condition now complained of by the plaintiff This court determines from the facts 
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deemed admitted together with the facts set forth in Exhibit 4 of the Neil J. Wall deposition and 
the deposition of Glenn Roy Maughan, do not indicate there was a landslide condition that would 
have been known to Green and Wall at the times in question, as alleged by the plaintiffs. 
5. As a matter of law, plaintiff has also failed to state a claim in his pleadings for 
fraudulent non-disclosure and further, even if such a cause of action had been pled, there has 
been a failure to establish that the alleged non-disclosed information was known to Green and 
Wall Further, plaintiff has failed to establish a legal duty on the part Green and Wall to 
communicate with the plaintiff. 
6. It is undisputed that Green and Wall did not sell the subject lot to the plaintiff, and 
plaintiff has failed to establish facts from which this court would find a legal duty to the plaintiff. 
7. In the case before this court, the only issues of damage involved are those of 
economic loss for which no recovery is available under the theories pled by the plaintiff in this 
action, whether in negligence or alleged warranty proposed by plaintiff. 
8. Plaintiff has not provided the Court with a basis to determine that there were any 
concealed conditions known to Green and Wall at the time of the sale to GMW/Ivory and further. 
the plaintiff was outside the land at the time of the damages alleged. Therefore, the exceptions to 
the doctrine of caveat emptor, urged by plaintiff do not exist in this case. Accordingly, the Court 
determines that the cases cited and relied upon by the parties support the granting of summary 
judgment to Green and Wall. 
9. The Court has spent considerable time reviewing the memoranda of the parties 
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and the case law and in ruling on the motions at the subject hearing did so, having first fully 
reviewed all matters submitted and having considered the oral argument of counsel and the legal 
precedent and rules stated herein. Therefore, it is 
HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Motions for 
Summary Judgment of Green and Wall are granted and the claims of the plaintiff against Green 
and Wall are hereby dismissed with prejudice, costs to defendants. 
DATED this S ^ day of ^wSSS*T 2001. 
BY THE COURT: 
<jku4' 
Thomas L. Kay 
Second District Court Jucfcg^ j 
'C s ^ 
A 
Approved as to Form: 
aVar E. Stark 
ttorney for Plaintiff 
5 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this / day of November, 2001 a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Summary Judgment and Dismissal of Edward D. Green and Neil Wall, aka 
Neil J. Wall was served by the method indicated below, to the following: 
LaVar E. Stark 
2485 Grant Avenue 
Suite 200 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Frank M. Wells 
Co-Counsel for Plaintiff 
2485 Grant Avenue, Suite 200 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
MT 
( ) 
( ) 
( ) 
( ^ 
( ) 
( ) 
( ) 
U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
Overnight Mail 
Facsimile 
U.S. Mail. Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
Overnight Mail 
Facsimile 
Elizabeth Hruby-Mills 
Brandon B. Hobbs 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER 
& NELSON 
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor 
50 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Attorneys for Defendant Neil Wall 
{Y^ U.S. Mail Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
David R. Hamilton 
SMITH, KNOWLES & HAMILTON 
4723 Harrison Blvd., Suite 200 
Ogden, Utah 84403 
Additional Attorneys for Defendant 
Neil Wall 
vr 
o 
o 
o 
U.S. Mail Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
Overnight Mail 
Facsimile 
6 
Barbara Berrett Uf 
WEISS, BERRETT & PETTY ( ) 
Attorneys for GMW Development, Inc. ( ) 
dba Ivory North ( ) 
Key Bank Tower 
50 South Main Street, Suite 530 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
Overnight Mail 
Facsimile 
4770.401 
7 
Rju t» •." ; - ML.ICU.CK V. Blake. 2b Utah 2d Bank & Trust Co.. 754 P.2d 1222 lUtah 1988»: 
22, 4M I'.jci 164 '1971): Whitmore v. Calavo Sather v. Pitcher. 748 P.2d 191 (Utah Ct. App. 
Growers. L^ Utah 2d 165. 499 P.2d 849 11972): 1987); Lloyds Unlimited v. Natures Way 
Whitmore v. Industrial Comm'n, 28 Utah 2d Mktg., Ltd., 753 P.2d 507 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); 
185. 499 P.2d 1290 (1972); Pacific Marine Price-Orem Inv. Co. v. Rollins, Brown & 
Schwabacher. Inc. v.Hydroswift Corp., 525 P.2d Gunnell, Inc., 784 P.2d 475 (Utah Ct. App. 
615 (Utah 1974): Midwest Realty v. City of West 1989,. p r o w s v state, 822 P.2d 764 (Utah 1991); 
Jordan, 541 P.2d 1109 (Utah 1975); Lignell v.
 J o n e s Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough v. 
Berg, 593 P.2d 800 (Utah 1979); Lewis v. Dawson, 923 P.2d 1366 (Utah 1996); James v. 
Moultree. 627 P.2d 94 (Utah 1981); Eie v. St. Galetka, 965 P.2d 567 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), 
Benedict's Hosp.. 638 P.2d 1190 (Utah 1981):
 c e r t denied, 982 P.2d 88 (Utah 1999); Conder v. 
Triple I Supply. Inc. v. Sunset Rail, Inc., 652
 H u n t 2000 UT App 105, 1 P.3d 558. 
P.2d 1298 <Utah 1982): Sears v. Riemersma, 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Journal of Contemporary Law. — The judgment, judgment on the pleadings, or di-
Recovery of Attorney Fees in Utah: A Proce- rected verdict, 36 A.L.R.3d 1113. 
dural Primer for Practitioners, 23 J. Contemp. Power of court sitting as trier of fact to 
L. 379 (1997). dismiss at close of plaintiff's evidence notwith-
Am. Jur. 2d. — 61A Am. Jur. 2d Pleading standing plaintiff has made out prima facie 
§ 1 et seq. case, 55 A.L.R.3d 272. 
C.J.S. — 71 C.J.S. Pleading §§ 1 to 53, 63 et Right to amend pending personal injury ac-
seq., 99 et seq.. 152 et seq.r 163 et seq. tion by including action for wrongful death 
A.L.R. — Infant's misrepresentation as to his after statute of limitations has run against 
age as estopping him from disaffirming his independent death action. 71 A.L.R.3d 933. 
voidable transaction. 29 A.L.R.3d 1270. Dismissal of state court action for plaintiff's 
Right to voluntary dismissal of civil action as failure or refusal to obey court order relating to 
affected by opponent s motion for summary pleadings or parties, 3 A.L.R.5th 237. 
Rule 9. Pleading special matters. 
(a)(1) Capacity. It is not necessary to aver the capacity of a party to sue or 
be sued or the authority of a party to sue or be sued in a representative 
capacity or the legal existence of an organized association of persons that is 
made a party. When a party desires to raise an issue as to the legal existence 
of any party or the capacity of any party to sue or be sued or the authority of 
a party to sue or be sued in a representative capacity, he shall do so by specific 
negative averment, which shall include such supporting particulars as are 
peculiarly within the pleader's knowledge, and on such issue the party relying 
on such capacity, authority, or legal existence, shall establish the same on the 
trial. 
(2) Designation of unknown defendant. When a party does not know the 
name of an adverse party, he may state that fact in the pleadings, and 
thereupon such adverse party may be designated in any pleading or proceeding 
by any name; provided, that when the true name of such adverse party is 
ascertained, the pleading or proceeding must be amended accordingly. 
(3) Actions to quiet title; description of interest of unknown parties. In an 
action to quiet title wherein any of the parties are designated in the caption as 
"unknown," the pleadings may describe such unknown persons as "all other 
persons unknown, claiming any right, title, estate or interest in, or lien upon 
the real property described in the pleading adverse to the complainant's 
ownership, or clouding his title thereto." 
(b) Fraud, mistake, condition of the mind. In all averments of fraud or 
mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with 
particularity Malice, intent, knowledge, and other condition of mind of a 
person may be averred generally. 
(c) Conditions precedent. In pleading the performance or occurrence of 
conditions precedent, it is sufficient to aver generally that all conditions 
precedent have been performed or have occurred. A denial of performance or 
occurrence shall be made specifically and with particularity, and when so made 
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the party pleading the performance or occurrence shall on the trial establish 
the facts showing such performance or occurrence. 
(d) Official document or act. In pleading an official document or act it is 
sufficient to aver that the document was issued or the act done in compliance 
with law. 
(e) Judgment. In pleading a judgment or decision of a domestic or foreign 
court, judicial or quasi-judicial tribunal, or of a board or officer, it is sufficient 
to aver the judgment or decision without setting forth matter showing 
jurisdiction to render it. A denial of jurisdiction shall be made specifically and 
with particularity and when so made the party pleading the judgment or 
decision shall establish on the trial all controverted jurisdictional facts. 
(f) Time and place. For the purpose of testing the sufficiency of a pleading, 
averments of time and place are material and shall be considered like all other 
averments of material matter. 
(g) Special damage. When items of special damage are claimed, they shall 
be specifically stated. 
(h) Statute of limitations. In pleading the statute of limitations it is not 
necessary to state the facts showing the defense but it may be alleged generally 
that the cause of action is barred by the provisions of the statute relied on, 
referring to or describing such statute specifically and definitely by section 
number, subsection designation, if any, or otherwise designating the provision 
relied upon sufficiently clearly to identify it. If such allegation is controverted, 
the party pleading the statute must establish, on the trial, the facts showing 
that the cause of action is so barred. 
(i) Private statutes; ordinances. In pleading a private statute of this state, or 
an ordinance of any political subdivision thereof, or a right derived from such 
statute or ordinance, it is sufficient to refer to such statute or ordinance by its 
title and the day of its passage or by its section number or other designation in 
any official publication of the statutes or ordinances. The court shall thereupon 
take judicial notice thereof. 
(j) Libel and slander. 
(1) Pleading defamatory matter. It is not necessary in an action for libel or 
slander to set forth any intrinsic facts showing the application to the plaintiff 
of the defamatory matter out of which the action arose; but it is sufficient to 
state generally that the same was published or spoken concerning the plaintiff. 
If such allegation is controverted, the party alleging such defamatory matter 
must establish, on the trial, that it was so published or spoken. 
(2) Pleading defense. In his answer to an action for libel or slander, the 
defendant may allege both the truth of the matter charged as defamatory and 
any mitigating circumstances to reduce the amount of damages, and, whether 
he proves the justification or not, he may give in evidence the mitigating 
circumstances. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to 
Rule 9, F.R.C.R 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Conditions precedent. —Failure to raise. 
Fraud. Waiver. 
— Forgery. —Specific negative averment. 
— General accusations. Libel and slander. 
Insufficient. —Actual harm. 
Negligence. Mistake. 
Mippi'i: »•! !u- lnil'lLttive a>sistance claim, the performed effectively. Staie v. Litherland. 2000 
appellate court would not remand the case for UT 76. 12 P.3d 92. 
an evidentiary hearing. It would be improper to 
remand a claim under this rule for a fishing Y ? ? ? e ' - o r ^ • • i 
expedition. State v. Garrett, 849 R2d 578 (Utah . \ R u l e 2 3 B m o l t l ? n f o r , r e m a n d 1S * s P e c i a l -
Ct. App.». cert, denied. 860 P. 943 (Utah 1993). l z e d m o t l o n< available only m limited; circum-
stances, to supplement the record with known 
Allegation of prejudice required. facts needed for an appellant to assert an 
In hearing under this rule, criminal defen- ineffectiveness of counsel claim on direct ap-
dant has burden of showing that counsel's rep- peal, and if the facts already appearing in the 
resentation fell below an objective standard of record are sufficient to make the claim, a re-
reasonableness and that but for counsel's er- mand is not needed. If defendant merely hopes 
rors, a more favorable result would have been to discover evidence suggesting ineffectiveness, 
obtained; defendant, convicted of raping his a remand is not allowed, because the purpose of 
daughter and sentenced to a term of 15 years to the rule is not to hold a "mini-trial" on ineffec-
life, failed to demonstrate that trial or appel- tiveness of counsel. State v. Johnston, 2000 UT 
late counsel s ineffectiveness deprived him of App 290, 13 P.3d 175. 
the ability to raise meritorious arguments on 
appeal. State v. Reyes, 2001 UT 66, 31 P.3d 516. C l t e d i n S t a t e v- Classon, 935 P.2d 524 (Utah 
F F J
 Ct. App. 1997). cert, granted, 945 P.2d 1118 
Application. (Utah 1997); State v. Bredehoft, 966 P.2d 285 
Under this rule, appellate courts need no (Utah Ct. App. 1998), cert, denied, 982 P.2d 88 
longer treat the question of an adequate record (Utah 1999); State v. Simmons, 2000 UT App 
as a necessary threshold issue; if the record is 190, 398 Utah Adv. Rep. 7; State v. Mecham, 
inadequate in any fashion, ambiguities or defi- 2000 UT App 247, 9 P.3d 777. 
Rule 24. Briefs. 
(a) Brief of the appellant. The brief of the appellant shall contain under 
appropriate headings and in the order indicated: 
( D A complete list of all parties to the proceeding in the court or agency 
whose judgment or order is sought to be reviewed, except where the caption of 
the case on appeal contains the names of all such parties. The list should be set 
out on a separate page which appears immediately inside the cover. 
(2) A table of contents, including the contents of the addendum, with page 
references. 
(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged and with 
parallel citations, rules, statutes and other authorities cited, with references to 
the pages of the brief where they are cited. 
(4) A brief statement showing the jurisdiction of the appellate court. 
(5) A statement of the issues presented for review, including for each issue: 
the standard of appellate review with supporting authority; and 
(A) citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved in the trial 
court; or 
(B) a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved in 
the trial court. 
(6) Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regulations 
whose interpretation is determinative of the appeal or of central importance to 
the appeal shall be set out verbatim with the appropriate citation. If the 
pertinent part of the provision is lengthy, the citation alone will suffice, and the 
provision shall be set forth in an addendum to the brief under paragraph (H} 
of this rule. 
(DA statement of the case. The statement shall first indicate briefly the 
nature of the case, the course of proceedings, and its disposition in the court 
below. A statement of the facts relevant to the issues presented for review shall 
follow. All statements of fact and references to the proceedings below shall be 
supported by citations to the record in accordance with paragraph (e) of this 
rule. 
(8) Summary of arguments. The summary of arguments, suitabl} 
paragraphed, shall be a succinct condensation of the arguments actually made 
in the body of the brief. It shall not be a mere repetition of the heading undef 
which the argument is arranged. 
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(9) An argument. The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of 
the appella n t w ^ h respect to the issues presented, including the grounds for 
reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the 
authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on. A party challenging a 
fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged 
finding. 
(10) A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought. 
( 1 1 ) An addendum to the brief or a statement that no addendum is necessary 
under this paragraph. The addendum shall be bound as part of the brief unless 
doing so makes the brief unreasonably thick. If the addendum is bound 
separately, the addendum shall contain a table of contents. The addendum 
shall contain a copy of: 
(A) any constitutional provision, statute, rule, or regulation of central 
importance cited in the brief but not reproduced verbatim in the brief; 
(B) in cases being reviewed on certiorari, a copy of the Court of Appeals 
opinion; in all cases any court opinion of central importance to the appeal but 
not available to the court as part of a regularly published reporter service; and 
(C) those parts of the record on appeal that are of central importance to the 
determination of the appeal, such as the challenged instructions, findings of 
fact and conclusions of law, memorandum decision, the transcript of the court's 
oral decision, or the contract or document subject to construction. 
(b) Brief of the appellee. The brief of the appellee shall conform to the 
requirements of paragraph (a) of this rule, except that the appellee need not 
include: 
(1) a statement of the issues or of the case unless the appellee is dissatisfied 
with the statement of the appellant; or 
(2) an addendum, except to provide material not included in the addendum 
of the appellant. The appellee may refer to the addendum of the appellant. 
(c) Reply brief The appellant may file a brief in reply to the brief of the 
appellee, and if the appellee has cross-appealed, the appellee may file a brief in 
reply to the response of the appellant to the issues presented by the cross-
appeal. Reply briefs shall be limited to answering any new matter set forth in 
the opposing brief. The content of the reply brief shall conform to the 
requirements of paragraph (a)(2), (3), (9), and (10) of this rule. No further 
briefs may be filed except with leave of the appellate court. 
(d) References in briefs to parties. Counsel will be expected in their briefs 
and oral arguments to keep to a minimum references to parties by such 
designations as "appellant" and "appellee." It promotes clarity to use the 
designations used in the lower court or in the agency proceedings, or the actual 
names of parties, or descriptive terms such as "the employee," uthe injured 
person," "the taxpayer," etc. 
(e) References in briefs to the record. References shall be made to the pages 
of the original record as paginated pursuant to Rule 1Kb) or to pages of any 
statement of the evidence or proceedings or agreed statement prepared 
pursuant to Rule 11(0 or 11(g). References to pages of published depositions or 
transcripts shall identify the sequential number of the cover page of each 
volume as marked by the clerk on the bottom right corner and each separately 
numbered page(s) referred to within the deposition or transcript as marked by 
the transcriber. References to exhibits shall be made to the exhibit numbers. If 
reference is made to evidence the admissibility of which is in controversy, 
reference shall be made to the pages of the record at which the evidence was 
identified, offered, and received or rejected. 
(f) Length of briefs. Except by permission of the court, principal briefs shall 
not exceed 50 pages, and reply briefs shall not exceed 25 pages, exclusive of 
pages containing the table of contents, tables of citations and any addendum 
containing statutes, rules, regulations, or portions of the record as required by 
paragraph (a) of this rule. In cases involving cross-appeals, paragraph (g) of 
this rule sets forth the length of briefs. 
Rule 24 UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 528 
(g> Briefs in cases involving cross-appeals. If a cross-appeal is filed, the party 
first filing a notice of appeal shall be deemed the appellant for the purposes of 
this rule and Rule 26, unless the parties otherwise agree or the court otherwise 
orders. The brief of the appellant shall not exceed 50 pages in length. The brief 
of the appellee/cross-appellant shall contain the issues and arguments in-
volved in the cross-appeal as well as the answer to the brief of the appellant 
and shall not exceed 50 pages in length. The appellant shall then file a brief 
which contains an answer to the original issues raised by the appellee/cross-
appellant and a reply to the appellee's response to the issues raised in the 
appellant's opening brief. The appellant's second brief shall not exceed 25 
pages in length. The appellee/cross-appellant may then file a second brief, not 
to exceed 25 pages in length, which contains only a reply to the appellant's 
answers to the original issues raised by the appellee/cross-appellant's first 
brief. The lengths specified by this rule are exclusive of table of contents, table 
of authorities, and addenda and may be exceeded only by permission of the 
court. The court shall grant reasonable requests, for good cause shown. 
(h) Briefs in cases involving multiple appellants or appellees. In cases 
involving more than one appellant or appellee, including cases consolidated for 
purposes of the appeal, any number of either may join in a single brief, and any 
appellant or appellee may adopt by reference any part of the brief of another. 
Parties may similarly join in reply briefs. 
(i) Citation of supplemental authorities. When pertinent and significant 
authorities come to the attention of a party after that party's brief has been 
filed, or after oral argument but before decision, a party may promptly advise 
the clerk of the appellate court, by letter setting forth the citations. An original 
letter and nine copies shall be filed in the Supreme Court. An original letter 
and seven copies shall be filed in the Court of Appeals. There shall be a 
reference either to the page of the brief or to a point argued orally to which the 
citations pertain, but the letter shall without argument state the reasons for 
the supplemental citations. Any response shall be made within 7 days of filing 
and shall be similarly limited. 
(j) Requirements and sanctions. All briefs under this rule must be concise, 
presented with accuracy, logically arranged with proper headings and free 
from burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial or scandalous matters. Briefs which 
are not in compliance may be disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua sponte 
by the court, and the court may assess attorney fees against the offending 
lawyer. 
(k) Brief covers. The covers of all briefs shall be of heavy cover stock and 
shall comply with Rule 27. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992; July 1, 1994; April 1, 1995; April 1, 1998; 
November 1, 1999.) 
Advisory Committee Note. — Rule 24 
(a)(9) now reflects what Utah appellate courts 
have long held. See In re Beesley, 883 P.2d 1343, 
1349 (Utah 1994); Newmever v. Newmeyer, 745 
R2d 1276, 1278 (Utah 1987). To successfully 
appeal a trial court s findings of fact, appellate 
counsel must play the devils advocate. ' must 
extricate from the client's shoes and fully as-
sume the adversary's position. In order to prop-
erly discharge the duty..., the challenger must 
present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, 
every scrap of competent evidence introduced 
at trial which supports the verv findings the 
appellant resists." ONEIDA! SLIC, v. ONEIDA 
Cold Storage and Warehouse, Inc., 872 P.2d 
1051, 1052-53 (Utah App. 1994) (alteration in 
original) (quoting West Valley City v. Majestic 
Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah App. 1991))-
See also State ex rel. M.S. v. Salata, 806 P2d 
1216, 1218 (Utah App. 1991); Bell v. Elder, 782 
P.2d 545, 547 (Utah App. 1989); State v. Moore, 
802 P.2d 732, 738-39 (Utah App. 1990». 
The brief must contain for each issue raised 
on appeal, a statement of the applicable stan-
dard of review and citation of supporting au-
thority. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1998 amend-
ment added the second sentence in Subdivision 
(e) concerning published depositions or tran-
scripts. 
The 1999 amendment added the last M" 
tence in Subdivision (a)(9). 
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Rule 4-408.01. Responsibility for administration of trial 
courts. 
Intent: 
To designate the court locations administered directly through the admin-
istrative office of the courts and those administered through contract with local 
government pursuant to § 78-3-21. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to the trial courts of record and to the administrative 
office of the courts. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) All locations of the juvenile court shall be administered directly through 
the administrative office of the courts. 
(2) All locations of the district court shall be administered directly through 
the administrative office of the courts, except the following, which shall be 
administered through contract with county or municipal government pursuant 
to § 78-3-21: Fillmore, Junction, Kanab, Loa, Manila, Manti, Morgan, 
Panguitch, Randolph, and Salem. 
(Added effective November 15, 1995; amended effective January 27, 1997; 
November 1, 1998; November 1, 2001.) 
Amendment Notes. — The 1998 amend- The 2001 amendment deleted "Coalville" and 
ment deleted "Beaver" before "Coalville" in "Park City" from the list in Subdivision (2). 
Subdivision (2). 
ARTICLE 5. CIVIL PRACTICE 
Rule 4-501. Motions. 
Intent: 
To establish a uniform procedure for filing motions, supporting memoranda 
and documents with the court. 
To establish a uniform procedure for requesting and scheduling hearings on 
dispositive motions. 
To establish a procedure for expedited dispositions. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to motion practice in all trial courts of record except 
proceedings before the court commissioners and small claims cases. This rule 
does not apply to petitions for habeas corpus or other forms of extraordinary 
relief. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) Filing and service of motions and memoranda. 
(A) Motion and supporting memoranda. All motions, except uncontested or 
ex-parte matters, shall be accompanied by a memorandum of points an 
authorities appropriate affidavits, and copies of or citations by page number 
relevant portions of depositions, exhibits or other documents relied upon i 
support of the motion. Memoranda supporting or opposing a motion shall n ^  
exceed ten pages in length exclusive of the "statement of material facts -
provided in paragraph (2), except as waived by order of the court on ex-par 
application. If an ex-parte application is made to file an over-length memor ^ 
dum, the application shall state the length of the principal memorandum, a ^ 
if the memorandum is in excess of ten pages, the application shall inclu 
summary of the memorandum, not to exceed five pages. c\e 
(B) Memorandum in opposition to motion. The responding party shall ^ 
and serve upon all parties within ten days after service of a motl0^on 
memorandum in opposition to the motion, and all supporting documenta ^ 
If the responding party fails to file a memorandum in opposition to the tno ^ 
within ten days after service of the motion, the moving party may notify 
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clerk to submit the matter to the court for decision as provided in paragraph 
(1)(D* of this rule. 
(C) Reply memorandum. The moving party may serve and file a reply 
memorandum within five days after service of the responding party's memo-
randum. 
(D) Notice to submit for decision. Upon the expiration of the five-day period 
to file a reply memorandum, either party may notify the clerk to submit the 
matter to the court for decision. The notification shall be in the form of a 
separate written pleading and captioned "Notice to Submit for Decision." The 
Notice to Submit for Decision shall state the date on which the motion was 
served, the date the memorandum in opposition, if any, was served, the date 
the reply memorandum, if any, was served, and whether a hearing has been 
requested. The notification shall contain a certificate of mailing to all parties. 
If neither party files a notice, the motion will not be submitted for decision. 
(2) Motions for summary judgment. 
(A) Memorandum in support of a motion. The points and authorities in 
support of a motion for summary judgment shall begin with a section that 
contains a concise statement of material facts as to which movant contends no 
genuine issue exists. The facts shall be stated in separate numbered sentences 
and shall specifically refer to those portions of the record upon which the 
movant relies. 
(B) Memorandum in opposition to a motion. The points and authorities in 
opposition to a motion for summary judgment shall begin with a section that 
contains a verbatim restatement of each of the movant's statement of facts as 
to which the party contends a genuine issue exists followed by a concise 
statement of material facts which support the party's contention. Each 
disputed fact shall be stated in separate numbered sentences and shall 
specifically refer to those portions of the record upon which the opposing party 
relies. All material facts set forth in the movant's statement and properly 
supported by an accurate reference to the record shall be deemed admitted for 
the purpose of summary judgment unless specifically controverted by the 
opposing party's statement. 
(3) Hearings. 
(A) A decision on a motion shall be rendered without a hearing unless 
ordered by the court, or requested by the parties as provided in paragraphs 
(3)(B) or (4) below. 
(B) In cases where the granting of a motion would dispose of the action or 
any claim in the action on the merits with prejudice, either party at the time 
of filing the principal memorandum in support of or in opposition to a motion 
may file a written request for a hearing. 
(C) Such request shall be granted unless the court finds tha t (a) the motion 
or opposition to the motion is frivolous or (b) that the dispositive issue or set of 
issues governing the granting or denial of the motion has been authoritatively 
decided. 
(D) When a request for hearing is denied, the court shall notify the 
requesting party. When a request for hearing is granted, the court shall set the 
matter for hearing or notify the requesting party that the matter shall be 
heard and the requesting party shall schedule the mat ter for hearing and 
notify all parties of the date and time. 
(E) In those cases where a hearing is granted, a courtesy copy of the motion, 
memorandum of points and authorities and all documents supporting or 
opposing the motion shall be delivered to the judge hearing the matter at least 
two working days before the date set for hearing. Copies shall be clearly 
marked as courtesy copies and indicate the date and time of the hearing. 
Courtesy copies shall not be filed with the clerk of the court. 
(F) If no written request for a hearing is made at the time the parties file 
their principal memoranda, a hearing on the motion shall be deemed waived. 
a n All dispositive motions shall be heard at least thirty (30) days before the 
scheduled trial date. No dispositive motions shall be heard after that date 
\wthout leave of the court. 
(H) If a hearing has been requested and the non-moving party fails to file a 
memorandum in opposition, the moving party may withdraw the request or 
the court on its own motion may strike the request and decide the motion 
without oral argument. 
14) Expedited dispositions. Upon motion and notice and for good cause 
shown, the court may grant a request for an expedited disposition in any case 
where time is of the essence and compliance with the provisions of this rule 
would be impracticable or where the motion does not raise significant legal 
issues and could be resolved summarily. 
(5) Telephone conference. The court on its own motion or at a party's request 
may direct arguments of any motion by telephone conference without court 
appearance. A verbatim record shall be made of all telephone arguments and 
the rulings thereon if requested by counsel. 
(Amended effective January 15, 1990; April 15, 1991; November 1, 1996; 
November 1, 1998; April 1, 1999; April 1, 2001; November 1, 2001.) 
Amendment Notes. — The 1998 amend-
ment substituted "trial courts of record" for 
"district courts" in the applicability paragraph, 
added Subdivision (3)(h), and made a stylistic 
change 
The 1999 amendment substituted uclaim" for 
"issues" in Subdivision (3KB) 
The April 2001 amendment added the second 
sentence to Subdivision (1KD) and made stylis-
tic changes in the subdivision designations 
Decisions sua sponte 
Purpose 
Request for hearing 
Supplemental memoranda. 
When rule applies 
Cited 
Decisions sua sponte. 
While a court may refrain from addressing a 
matter that is not submitted for decision under 
this rule, nothing in this rule or any other rule 
bars a court from deciding such a matter sua 
sponte Scott v Majors, 1999 UT App 139, 980 
P2d 214, cert denied, 994 P2d 1271 (Utah 
1999) 
No notice to submit for decision under this 
rule is required, and a trial therefore correctly 
determined that it could rule on pending mo-
tions sua sponte Scott v Majors, 1999 UT App 
139, 980 P2d 214, cert denied, 994 P2d 1271 
(Utah 1999) 
Purpose. 
The purpose of the code of judicial adminis-
tration is not to create or modify substantive 
rights of litigants, but to bring order to the 
manner in which the courts operate Scott v 
Majors, 1999 UT App 139, 980 P2d 214, cert 
denied, 994 P2d 1271 (Utah 1999) 
Request for hearing. 
Once a request for hearing by one of the 
parties has been granted and the matter set for 
hearing, the other party has a right to rely upon 
such setting regardless of whether it made its 
The November 2001 amendment, in Subdivi-
sion (2)(B), at the end of the first sentence 
substituted the language beginning Contains a 
verbatim restatement" for "a concise statement 
of material facts as to which the party contends 
a genuine issue exists" and deleted "and, if 
applicable, shall state the numbered sentence 
or sentences of the movant's facts that are 
disputed" at the end of the second sentence 
own request Price v Armour. 949 P2d 1251 
(Utah 1997) 
Supplemental memoranda. 
The plural "memoranda* in Subdiv lsion (1)' a» 
refers to all memoranda received by the court 
— from all parties that either oppose or support 
any motion — and does not mean that each 
party may submit more than one memoran-
dum, thus, the trial court was well within it? 
discretion in refusing to accept a supplemental 
memorandum that was submitted without 
prior invitation and outside the bounds of Pr0* 
cedural rules Hartford Leasing Corp \ State 
888 P2d 694 lUtah Ct App 1994) 
When rule applies. 
Because the defendants Rule 56<e> objection 
to the plaintiff's first affidavit was framed a-£ 
separate, written motion to strike the plain11 ^ 
should have been given ten davs to respond 
prescribed bv Subdivision 11M b» of this ru 
Gillmor v Cummmgs, 806 P2d 1205 (Utah c 
App 1991) .
 d 
Even though the trial court had confa ^ 
both parties' motions and memoranda for ^ 
against the award of attornev fee^ it e r?\ e C j 
entering its decision before the time a ^ 
under this rule to file a replv memorandun^ ^ 
expired and in not reconsidering its ^ c l s
 aPd 
reviewing plaintiffs reph munorandu^ ^ 
revised affidavits American Vendue ^ 
Inc v Morse 881 P2d 917 I ^ h l 
1994) 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
^ 0 1 OPERATION OF THE COUKTS Rule 4-501 
gule 4-408. Locations of trial courts of record. 
Intent: 
To designate locations of trial courts of record. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to all trial courts of record. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) Each county seat and the following municipalities are hereby designated 
as locations of trial courts of record: American Fork; Bountiful; Cedar City; 
Layton; Murray; Orem; Park City; Roosevelt; Roy; Salem; Sandy; Spanish 
Fork; West Valley City. 
(2) Subject to limitations imposed by law, any trial court of record may hold 
court in any location designated by this rule. 
(Added effective January 1, 1992; amended effective November 15, 1995.) 
Rule 4-408.01. Responsibility for administration of trial 
courts. 
Intent: 
To designate the court locations administered directly through the admin-
istrative office of the courts and those administered through contract with local 
government pursuant to § 78-3-21. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to the trial courts of record and to the administrative 
office of the courts. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) All locations of the juvenile court shall be administered directly through 
the administrative office of the courts. 
(2) All locations of the district court shall be administered directly through 
the administrative office of the courts, except the following, which shall be 
administered through contract with county or municipal government pursuant 
to § 78-3-21: Coalville, Fillmore, Junction, Kanab, Loa, Manila, Manti, Mor-
gan, Panguitch, Park City, Randolph, and Salem. 
(Added effective November 15, 1995; amended effective January 27, 1997; 
November 1, 1998.) 
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amend- leted "Castle Dale" from the listed exceptions. 
mentt in Subdivision (2), substituted "district The 1998 amendment deleted "Beaver" be-
court" for "district and circuit courts" and de- fore "Coalville" in Subdivision (2). 
plQQ I ARTICLE 5. CIVIL PRACTICE 
Rule 4-501. Motions. 
Intent: 
To establish a uniform procedure for filing motions, supporting memoranda 
and documents with the court. 
lb establish a uniform procedure for requesting and scheduling hearings on 
dispositive motions. 
lb establish a procedure for expedited dispositions. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to motion practice in all trial courts of record except 
proceedings before the court commissioners and small claims cases. This rule 
does not apply to petitions for habeas corpus or other forms of extraordinary 
relief. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) Filing and service of motions and memoranda. 
(A) Motion and supporting memoranda. All motions, except uncontested or 
ex-parte matters, shall be accompanied by a memorandum of points and 
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authorities appropriate affidavits, and copies of or citations by page number to 
relevant portions of depositions, exhibits or other documents relied upon in 
support of the motion. Memoranda supporting or opposing a motion shall not 
exceed ten pages in length exclusive of the "statement of material facts" as 
provided in paragraph (2), except as waived by order of the court on ex-parte 
application. If an ex-parte application is made to file an over-length memoran-
dum, the appUcation shall state the length of the principal memorandum, and 
if the memorandum is in excess of ten pages, the application shall include a 
summary of the memorandum, not to exceed five pages. 
(B) Memorandum in opposition to motion. The responding party shall file 
and serve upon all parties within ten days after service of a motion, a 
memorandum in opposition to the motion, and all supporting documentation. 
If the responding party fails to file a memorandum in opposition to the motion 
within ten days after service of the motion, the moving party may notify the 
clerk to submit the matter to the court for decision as provided in paragraph 
(1)(D) of this rule. 
(C) Reply memorandum. The moving party may serve and file a reply 
memorandum within five days after service of the responding party's memo-
randum. 
(D) Notice to submit for decision. Upon the expiration of the five-day period 
to file a reply memorandum, either party may notify the clerk to submit the 
matter to the court for decision. The notification shall be in the form of a 
separate written pleading and captioned "Notice to Submit for Decision." The 
Notice to Submit for Decision shall state the date on which the motion was 
served, the date the memorandum in opposition, if any, was served, the date 
the reply memorandum, if any, was served, and whether a hearing has been 
requested. The notification shall contain a certificate of mailing to all parties. 
If neither party files a notice, the motion will not be submitted for decision. 
(2) Motions for summary judgment. 
(A) Memorandum in support of a motion. The points and authorities in 
support of a motion for summary judgment shall begin with a section that 
contains a concise statement of material facts as to which movant contends no 
genuine issue exists. The facts shall be stated in separate numbered sentences 
and shall specifically refer to those portions of the record upon which the 
movant relies. 
(B) Memorandum in opposition to a motion. The points and authorities in 
opposition to a motion for summary judgment shall begin with a section that 
contains a concise statement of material facts as to which the party contends 
a genuine issue exists. Each disputed fact shall be stated in separate numbered 
sentences and shall specifically refer to those portions of the record upon which 
the opposing party relies, and, if applicable, shall state the numbered sentence 
or sentences of the movants facts that are disputed. All material facts set forth 
in the movant's statement and properly supported by an accurate reference to 
the record shall be deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment 
unless specifically controverted by the opposing party's statement. 
(3) Hearings. 
(A) A decision on a motion shall be rendered without a hearing unless 
ordered by the court, or requested by the parties as provided in paragraph 
(3)(B) or (4) below. 
(B) In cases where the granting of a motion would dispose of the action ol 
any claim in the action on the merits with prejudice, either party at the tin^ 
of filing the principal memorandum in support of or in opposition to a moti(h 
may file a written request for a hearing. 
(C) Such request shall be granted unless the court finds that (a) the inotl0!f 
or opposition to the motion is frivolous or (b) that the dispositive issue or set 
issues governing the granting or denial of the motion has been authoritative . 
decided. 
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(D) When a request for hearing is denied, the court shall notify the 
requesting party When a request for hearing is granted, the court shall set the 
matter for hearing or notify the requesting party that the matter shall be 
heard and the requesting party shall schedule the matter for hearing and 
notify all parties of the date and time. 
(E) In those cases where a hearing is granted, a courtesy copy of the motion, 
memorandum of points and authorities and all documents supporting or 
opposing the motion shall be delivered to the judge hearing the matter at least 
two working days before the date set for hearing. Copies shall be clearly 
marked as courtesy copies and indicate the date and time of the hearing. 
Courtesy copies shall not be filed with the clerk of the court. 
(F) If no written request for a hearing is made at the time the parties file 
their principal memoranda, a hearing on the motion shall be deemed waived. 
(G) All dispositive motions shall be heard at least thirty (30) days before the 
scheduled trial date. No dispositive motions shall be heard after that date 
without leave of the court. 
_1H) If a hearing has been requested and the non-moving party fails to file a 
memorandum in opposition, the moving party may withdraw the request or 
the court on its own motion may strike the request and decide the motion 
without oral argument. 
(4) Expedited dispositions. Upon motion and notice and for good cause 
shown, the court may grant a request for an expedited disposition in any case 
where time is of the essence and compliance with the provisions of this rule 
would be impracticable or where the motion does not raise significant legal 
issues and could be resolved summarily 
(5) Telephone conference. The court on its own motion or at a party's request 
may direct arguments of any motion by telephone conference without court 
appearance. A verbatim record shall be made of all telephone arguments and 
the rulings thereon if requested by counsel. 
(Amended effective January 15, 1990; April 15, 1991; November 1, 1996; 
November 1, 1998; April 1, 1999; April 1, 2001.) 
Amendment Notes. — The 1998 amend-
ment substituted "trial courts of record" for 
"district courts" in the applicability paragraph, 
added Subdivision (3)(h), and made a stylistic 
change. 
Decisions sua sponte. 
Purpose. 
Request for hearing. 
Supplemental memoranda. 
When rule applies. 
Cited. 
Decisions sua sponte. 
While a court may refrain from addressing a 
matter that is not submitted for decision under 
this rule, nothing in this rule or any other rule 
bars a court from deciding such a matter sua 
sponte. Scott v. Majors, 1999 UT App 139, 980 
R2d 214, cert, denied, 994 P.2d 1271 (Utah 
1999). 
No notice to submit for decision under this 
rule is required, and a trial therefore correctly 
determined that it could rule on pending mo-
tions sua sponte. Scott v. Majors, 1999 UT App 
139, 980 R2d 214, cert, denied, 994 P.2d 1271 
(Utah 1999). 
Purpose. 
The purpose of the code of judicial adminis-
The 1999 amendment substituted "claim" for 
"issues" in Subdivision (3XB). 
The 2001 amendment added the second sen-
tence to Subdivision (1XD) and made stylistic 
changes in the subdivision designations. 
tration is not to create or modify substantive 
rights of litigants, but to bring order to the 
manner in which the courts operate. Scott v. 
Majors, 1999 UT App 139, 980 P.2d 214, cert, 
denied, 994 P.2d 1271 (Utah 1999). 
Request for hearing. 
Once a request for hearing by one of the 
parties has been granted and the matter set for 
hearing, the other party has a right to rely upon 
such setting regardless of whether it made its 
own request. Price v. Armour, 949 P.2d 1251 
(Utah 1997). 
Supplemental memoranda. 
The plural "memoranda" in Subdivision (1 Ka) 
refers to all memoranda received by the court 
— from all parties that either oppose or support 
any motion — and does not mean that each 
party may submit more than one memoran-
dum; thus, the trial court was well within its 
discretion in refusing to accept a supplemental 
memorandum that was submitted without 
prior invitation and outside the bounds of pro-
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